The Working Lawyer as Subject and the Juridical Event

When introducing the respective roles of the philosopher and the mathematician in Being and Event, Alain Badiou notes that when representing mathematics: "placing being in the general position of an object, would immediately corrupt the necessity, for any ontological operation, of de-objedification. Hence, of course, the attitude of those the Americans call working mathematicians: they always find general considerations about their discipline vain and obsolete. They only trust whomever works hand in hand with them grinding away at the latest mathematical problem. . . .Empirically, the mathematician always suspects the philosopher of not knowing enough about mathematics to have earned the right to speak." While the discipline of law does not have the ontological purchase of the discipline of mathematics, the working lawyer, like the working mathematician, would feel disconnected from "the rigorous description of the generic essence of [his] operations" that the philosopher might offer. Badiou further reports that "justice" is a philosophical word if we do not include juridical significations in it. It is precisely here, when the juridical significations are left aside, that the lawyer (not the legislator) is excluded from the benefits of a "rigorous description" that a philosopher might offer. What can be done to extend the ontological understanding of justice to include the subjectivity of the lawyer and to determine whether the juridical is capable of Badiou's sense of "event?".