Falsifiability in the Philosophy of Science: Methodological Foundations, Conditions of Applicability, and the Problem of Metamethodological Calibration

The criterion of falsifiability has long occupied a central position in the philosophy of science as a normative principle of scientific rationality and demarcation. While extensively discussed and critically reassessed throughout the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, falsifiability continues to be applied across diverse philosophical and scientific contexts in ways that generate persistent methodological disputes. The present research argues that the persistence of these disputes is not primarily due to conceptual ambiguity in the criterion itself, but rather to the absence of an explicit procedural articulation of the conditions under which falsifiability is applied. The study develops a procedural reconstruction of falsifiability, treating it as a regulative normative structure whose methodological function depends on the type of scientific claims, the level of theoretical organization, and the context of philosophical-scientific evaluation. The analytical focus is shifted from the justification or rejection of falsifiability as a criterion to the examination of how it is actually used in philosophical-scientific reasoning, theory evaluation, and demarcation practices. The research demonstrates that falsifiability is routinely applied to epistemic objects of different logical status—hypotheses, theories, models, and research programs—without sufficient procedural differentiation. This lack of differentiation leads to methodological conflations, overgeneralization, and rhetorical use of the criterion, which in turn sustains long-standing controversies within philosophy of science and interdisciplinary research. Methodologically, the study employs procedural reconstruction as an analytical approach aimed at explicating stable forms of methodological reasoning already operative in philosophical-scientific practice. A procedure is understood as a structured sequence of analytical steps governing the application of a normative criterion to specific epistemic objects. Procedurality is expressed through the differentiation of levels of analysis, the identification of relevant theoretical entities, and the specification of conditions under which evaluative transitions occur. The analysis is based on a systematic examination of classical and contemporary philosophical-scientific debates concerning demarcation, theory evaluation, and scientific rationality. By tracing recurring patterns of application and misapplication of falsifiability, the research identifies procedural regularities and sources of methodological divergence. This approach enables a structured account of how normative criteria function in practice and how methodological conflicts arise when procedural assumptions remain implicit. The main contribution of the study consists in demonstrating that normative criteria of scientific rationality, including falsifiability, function as procedurally organized regulative instruments rather than as universally applicable logical tests. On this basis, a generalizable metamethodological framework is proposed for analyzing other normative criteria, such as confirmation, explanatory adequacy, simplicity, and heuristic productivity. The theoretical significance of the research lies in advancing metamethodological analysis as an internal and legitimate dimension of philosophy of science. Practically, the proposed framework contributes to greater methodological transparency in philosophical-scientific discourse, interdisciplinary research, and expert evaluation of scientific theories by clarifying the conditions under which normative criteria are applied.