The Abstraction of Thinking: Wittgenstein's Critique of Abstraction in On Certainty

This paper examines the possibility and limits of abstraction in thinking through a close reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. While abstraction is commonly regarded as a precondition ofthought, the paper argues that, for Wittgenstein, abstraction becomesproblematic when detached from practical use. It is shown that think-ing, understood as a rule-governed activity within language-games, de-pends on certainties that function as conditions of sense rather thanas epistemic achievements. By analysing Wittgenstein’s treatment ofdoubt, knowledge, and rule-following, the paper develops the thesisthat complete abstraction does not represent a higher form of think-ing, but leads instead to the self-dissolution of thought. The paper concludes by situating Wittgenstein’s critique of abstraction as a methodological tool rather than a rejection of abstraction as such, and briefly considers its implications for highly abstract forms of thinking.