No Kind of Reason is the Wrong Kind of Reason

A reason is said to be “of the wrong kind” when, although it counts as a consideration broadly in favor of (or against) having an attitude, it seems to not bear on the object of the attitude in a way that is relevant to determining whether the attitude is appropriate. When applied to belief it is often taken as a datum that the only genuine or “right” reasons for belief are those that bear directly on the question of “whether p”; such reasons are often called “evidential” “epistemic” or perhaps “truth-directed” or “alethic.” Wrong kinds of reasons may have the appearance of reasons but are not genuine reasons. The challenge, or what is sometimes called “the wrong kind of reason problem” is to find some criterion which will delineate the right kind from the wrong kind such that only evidential reasons end up as the right kind. Many solutions have been offered and rejected, but there is a general consensus that there is a real distinction here and the challenge is to construct a theory which captures it. I argue that there is no distinction to capture, at least in the case of reasons for belief.