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Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers
We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility distributions and two standard settings: a finite horizon $T$ a
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