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Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making
This article introduces peer $k$-oversight, a property of sequential collective decision mechanisms requiring at least $k$ agents to be responsible for every harmful outcome. It is shown that whenever $k$-oversight can be achieved by redistributing control over the decisions in a mechanism, it can b
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