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Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals
We study constrained coalition formation in games induced by friends, enemies, and neutrals, under the two standard refinements of additively separable preferences: friend-oriented and enemy-oriented. We ask for partitions that are individually rational (IR), while additionally requiring exactly $k$
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