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A Systematic Approach to Mechanism Design with Stochastic Dynamic Stability
We consider a resource allocation problem with strategic agents that have private stochastic satisfaction functions and local constraints. To achieve a global optimal solution, we propose an incentive mechanism that induces a game among the agents. For the payment function of the mechanism, we const
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