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Strategic Inference in Stackelberg Games: Optimal Control for Revealing Adversary Intent
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized linear-quadratic tracking problem and responds to the leader's trajectory with a rand
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