Committing to the truth: the case of disjunction

If one believes that 2+2=4, then one also believes that either 2+2=4 or 971 is a cousin prime number. This follows from doxastic logics based on standard Kripke relational semantics, which validate disjunction introduction for belief. However, this principle does not hold in topic-sensitive semantics. An agent who lacks the concept of a ‘cousin prime number’ may be unable to entertain, and thus unable to believe, any proposition involving that concept. I argue that while disjunction introduction may fail for belief—and for other epistemic states that presuppose belief—it does hold for certain states that do not require belief. In this paper, I focus on the notion of commitment to the truth. Drawing on the concept of logical grounding, I propose formal semantics that preserve the requirement of topic-grasping, but weaken it in a way that allows for a more standard treatment of disjunction.