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Constant Individual Regret in General Games
Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OF
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