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Nash Core in Multiwinner Election

Goel, Ashish et al.
arXiv (All) · Papers
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computer-science-and-game-theory
In the approval-based committee selection problem, a committee is said to be in the core if no subset of voters has an incentive to deviate by selecting a \emph{blocking} committee of proportional size, such that every voter in the deviating group strictly prefers the blocking committee. We consid
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