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Ascending Auctions for Combinatorial Markets with Frictions: A Unified Framework via Discrete Convex Analysis
We develop a unified ascending-auction framework for computing Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment functions. Our auction extends the celebrated ascending auctions of Gul and Stacchetti (2000) and Ausubel (2006) to accommodate
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