(Neo)Carnap and (Neo)Quine as Quiet Relativists

In this paper I compare (Neo)Quine(an)’s views on ontology to that of (Neo)Carnap(ian)’s. My aim is to show that they ought not be perceived as rival positions, but should both be understood as ‘quiet relativists’. I do this by examining Quine’s critique of Carnap which was meant to set them apart. I explore their apparent differences regarding pragmatism and truth, which ultimately derive from Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. It turns out that their similarities outweigh their differences to the extent that the Quinean position is more properly understood as being quiet about ontology, with the only meaningful discussion of existence being relative to theory, similar to the Carnapian position. It is widely held that Quine’s place in history with regard to ontology is that he revived it in the face of Carnap’s deflation of it. This paper adds to the literature that seeks to clarify Quine not as the reviver of ontology but rather as being equally quiet about ontology as Carnap, defusing their presumed opposition. Furthermore, I will argue that the resulting Neo-Quinean position should not to be considered a form of realism, but is more accurately described as similar to a Neo-Carnapian position, namely, as a quietist relativism.