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A Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium for Early Insider-Threat Detection
We model insider threat detection as a dynamic Bayesian game in which a platform coordinates a committee of strategic certifiers to sustain equilibrium among honest users and detect malicious deviations before exfiltration. Certifiers and users operate under a Bayesian Temporal Correlated Equilibriu
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