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Bottom-Up Corporate Governance
In many instances, “independently-minded” top-ranking execu-tives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate gov-ernance. We provide robust em
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