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Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilib-rium, a CEO’s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model det
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