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Incentive Features in CEO Compensation: The Role of Regulation and Monitored Debt
We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by taking into account banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test t
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