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Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change
This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly ra
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