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Sharing Underwriters with Rivals: Implications for Competition in Investment Banking
We conjecture that issuing firms seek to avoid sharing underwriters with their product-market rivals in order to limit the risk that strategically sensitive information is leaked to a rival firm via the underwriter relationship. We investigate this conjecture in a sample of 5,272 equity deals and 12
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