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Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture se
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