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Professionalization and the CEO effect over the very long run
This paper introduces a new explanation for the time variation in the extent to which CEOs matter for firm performance: the professionalization of the role. We explore whether increased access to specialized knowledge and greater codification of executive responsibilities rendered CEOs increasingly
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