L'usage détermine-t-il le contexte chez Heidegger et chez Wittgenstein?

This paper focuses on the determinations of the notion of "use" in the early Heidegger – from the 1920’s – and in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. It aims to distinguish the notion of « use » from the one of « life’s practice », and more precisely, from the two notions of "life’s achievement" and "form of life". The objective is to point out that, although they are indeed very different, Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s notions of "use" both are specific and determined by their resistance to a context. This paper will therefore dwell more specifically on the analysis of the Heideggerian notion of « formal indication » and of a therapeutic and non hermeneutic notion of context in the Investigations