Time in Philosophy of Action

Action is inevitably temporal, not only because it takes time but also because action concerns us primarily in temporal contexts. This chapter examines three such contexts. First, I examine the nature of action, focusing on the way the differing temporal structures of actions and activities, on one hand, and events and processes, on the other, can make sense of the ontology and composition of action and the role of the agent. Second, I turn to the nature of intentions and their role in self-governance, and especially the question of whether agential authority depends on some mental state or on diachronic agential functioning. Third, I look at free will and self-creation, proposing that since challenges to free will have to do with the role of the past, defenses of free will might take their lead from this fact. I conclude by examining what I take to be the three most influential theories of agency in continental philosophy, which presented in this context have resonances with the approaches examined in the previous three sections. Throughout, I aim to highlight the suggestion that time is the medium through which agency manifests.