Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
metadata only
Two essays on managerial incentives
finance-and-financial-managementfirm-valuehuman-resources-managementindustrial-and-organizational-psychology
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) argue that the separation of ownership and control may generate agency problems between managers and shareholders. The equity-based compensation, by tying managerial wealth to firm long-run stock performance, can incentivize managers to be more receptive
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Does Equity-Based Compensation Increase Managers' Ownership?#942450
- The Effects Of Equity Incentives On Corporate Performance: The Mediating Role Of Research And Development Investment#786414
- Manager Remuneration, Share Buybacks and Firm Performance#657485
- THEORETICAL ASPECTS FOR THE FORMATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN COMPANIES#299605
- Do Customer Disclosures Affect Suppliers' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions?#780904
Record · ID 957950
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive