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Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach
We consider the problem of finding the (unique) minimal Walrasian equilibrium price in multi-item, multi-unit auction models: there are multiple indivisible items for sale, with several units of each item, and a bidder may be interested in buying more than one copy of each item. In its special case
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