arXiv (All)
open access
A zero-sum stochastic differential game with impulses, precommitment, and unrestricted cost functions
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start of the game, performing less than $q$ impulses ($q$ can be c
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Optimal Impulse Control for Cyber Risk Management#309950
- Incentive Design for Multi-Agent Systems: A Bilevel Optimization Framework for Coordinating Independent Agents and Convergence Analysis#1062611
- Evolution of fairness in multi-objective reinforcement learning framework#1119187
- Pure Risk#790265
- Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold?#1146548
Record · ID 984770
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive