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Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time
We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. There is an exogenous signal process, which the sender both garbles and stops, delaying the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of
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