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Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences
We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to (Knightian) uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We consider two properties: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge while the model's predictions are nonetheless accurate; and robustness, in which the sender also lacks
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