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Sequential Offering in On-Demand Platforms: On the Optimality of Greedy Ranking
On-demand platforms face the fundamental challenge of fulfilling time-sensitive jobs with independent workers who may decline offers. To minimize delays and unfulfilled jobs, platforms frequently raise the offered wage sequentially following each rejection. However, the interaction between these dyn
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