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Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion
We prove the existence of a randomized voting rule with metric distortion at most $2.13713$, within $0.025$ of the lower bound of $2.11264$. Our rule comes from a generalization of stable $k$-lotteries developed in the context of committee selection. In contrast to prior work, our rule samples from
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