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The Complexity of Membership, Uniqueness, and Counting for Optimal Proportional Approval Voting Committees
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) chooses committees that maximize a sum of harmonic utilities. We study the set of maximizing committees: whether a candidate belongs to some or all of them, whether the optimum is unique, and how many optima exist. When the committee size is part of the input, the
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