arXiv (All)
open access
No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional p
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Multiobjective Hypergraph Min-Cut in Quasi-Polynomial Time#927682
- A game-theoretic framework for multimodal information utilization under heterogeneous processing environments in neuroscience and perception science.#193634
- Need, Equity, and Accountability – Evidence on Third-Party Distributive Decisions from an Online Experiment#698699
- Discrete-time exploitative competition model of different stage-specific predators.#342588
- TO MONETIZE OR NOT: INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND GENDER IN MONETARY VALUATION OF MEANINGFUL EXPERIENCES#1135258
Record · ID 997922
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive