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Deriving the Pure Price of Anarchy for Networked Resource Allocation Games
This work considers multi-agent coordination with arbitrary information networks among the agents using a game-theoretic approach. A system designer aims to assign local utility functions to the agents to guide their actions toward a desired system objective. The performance of the assigned local ut
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