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On the Fragility of Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Atomic Congestion Games
Aggregate performance in smart mobility systems depends heavily on the emergent behavior of selfish, resource-sharing agents that participate within the systems. As a result, recent work has focused on how a system designer can leverage incentives to influence behavior so that system cost (e.g., tra
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