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Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape
We study control and bribery problems for stable matchings: A central authority (the controller, resp. briber) may add agents, delete agents, delete acceptable pairs, swap two adjacent agents in some agent's preference list, or arbitrarily reorder some agent's preference list, in an instance of Stab
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