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Fair Stable Matching: A Nash Social Welfare Approach
While traditional stable matching algorithms, such as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, prioritize stability, they may fall short of achieving equitable outcomes among participants. We study the role of \emph{Nash social welfare} (NSW) as a fairness objective in the classic \emph{stable marriage problem}.
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