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Optimal Strategies in a Sequential Contest with Failures
We study a Stackelberg model where two players compete in a sequential contest, and the player that successfully invests the most effort wins. Our formulation considers a probability that each player fails to invest their chosen level of effort, as captured by a failure function that increases with
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