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Robust Mechanism Design on Networks with Externalities
We study how to allocate a good with positive externalities among agents in an information network, without monetary transfers. Each agent observes their own valuation and those of their neighbors. A principal seeks to allocate the good to the highest-valuation agent through a mechanism robust to ag
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