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Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling
We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values. Although revenue-optimal mechanisms can require lotteries and infinite menus, Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinber
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