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Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model
We study a partial-participation variation of the Hotelling-Downs model. Voters each have a cost to vote, and only vote when the comparative gain from their preferred candidate exceeds the cost. Under this model the median voter theorem breaks, and we study the extent of polarization under equilibri
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