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Computational Complexity of Strong and Average Justified Representation
We study the approval-based multiwinner election problem where a set of $n$ voters cast approval-based ballots to a set of $m$ candidates, and we are to select a winner committee consisting of $k$ candidates. We consider two axioms: strong justified representation (SJR) and average justified represe
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