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Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots
We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this induces a (weak) order over the candidates. Ties are resolved uniformly at random, and voting has a small positive cost, so
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