arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
On testing the incentive compatibility of single-parameter allocation mechanisms
computational-complexitycomputer-science-and-game-theorydata-structures-and-algorithmstheoretical-economics
This paper is the first work at the intersection of game theory and property testing, giving algorithms and lower bounds for efficiently testing whether an allocation mechanism is incentive compatible (IC). We propose distinguishing whether a mechanism is $ε$-far from being IC, i.e., when it observe
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