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Nash Equilibria in Auctions with Pacing Strategies: Complexity and Inefficiency
We introduce and study Auctions with Pacing Strategies (APS) games, a full-information model in which utility-maximizing bidders compete across many simultaneous first-price auctions, each choosing a single pacing multiplier that uniformly scales their values into bids. We settle three central quest
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