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On the Power of Determinism in Multi-Item Auctions
We study the classical multi-item monopoly setting with a single additive buyer and $m$ heterogeneous items whose values are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. Optimal truthful auctions may be randomized and complicated. We analyze the approximation ratios of three simple deter
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