arXiv (All)
open access
Truthful-in-Expectation MMS Allocations for Chores
We study truthful-in-expectation (TIE) mechanisms for allocating indivisible chores alongside ex-post maximin share (MMS) guarantees. For goods, Bu and Tao (FOCS 2025) established a (1/n)-approximation for TIE mechanisms, and this was substantially improved by Babaioff, Feige, and Manaker Morag (FOC
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share Allocations#1084972
- On the Hardness of Maximin Share Allocations#1109881
- Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment#927231
- Pairwise Maximin Share Allocations Need Not Exist#973869
- On the Power of Determinism in Multi-Item Auctions#1130361
Record · ID 1129874
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive