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Optimal Networks with Accumulative Costs and Bidirectional Communication
This paper is an extension of the approach of Larrosa and Tohmé (2003), in which the payoff function is modified by allowing information to flow in both directions. Costs continue to be paid by the agent who initiates the connection, so this asymmetry reveals changes in the final equilibrium topolog
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