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Learning to Harvest Without Collapse in a Regenerative Commons: A Lagrangian Framework
The tragedy of the commons poses a multi-agent safety problem: reward-seeking agents can deplete a shared resource, and cooperation among its users does not itself specify how much must be preserved. We make preservation an explicit requirement by formulating a regenerative commons as a constrained
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