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Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections
We create a set of 6 axioms relating to strategic voting and study them on single transferable vote (STV), Meek STV, Bloc, Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda. For Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda, we implement ``optimistic'' and ``pessimistic'' models for handing incomplete ballots, thus
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